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CORPORATE CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A
BRIEF HISTORY AND AN OBSERVATION
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasive influence enjoyed by large, publicly held corporations
has inspired a body of scholarship that considers at length the need for
effective mechanisms to regulate institutional behavior.' Enforcement
of penal statutes applicable to corporations2 is, of course, included
among existing options, and renewed interest in criminally prosecuting
© Copyright 1982 by Kathleen F. Brickey. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of Kentucky.
1. For but a small sampling, see M. ANSHEN, CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL PER-
FORMANCE (1980); A. COHEN & R. LEOB, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1979); D. DFMOTT, COR-
PORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND REFORM (1980); W. GROENING, THE
MODERN CORPORATE MANAGER: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (1981); N. JACOBY, P.
NEHEMKIS & R. EELLS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD BUSINESS: A STUDY OF CORPO-
RATE POLITICAL PAYMENTS ABROAD (1977); Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, GOVERNMENT REGULA-
TION OF BUSINESS ETHICS: U.S. LEGISLATION OF INTERNATIONAL PAYOFFS (1978); C. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS-THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975); Goldberg, A
Defense of the Bureaucracy in Corporate Regulation and Some Personal Suggestionsfor Corporate
Reform, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 514 (1980); Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Target, 79
MiCH. L. REV. 478 (1981); Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liabili y in the Control of Corporate
Conduct. 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980); The Role of Professionals in Corporate Governance, 56 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 751 (1981).
2. Some federal regulatory statutes containing penal provisions specifically include corpora-
tions in the definition of the term "person," see, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976); Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(2) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1),
(9) (1976); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(e) (1976); Anti-Kickback Act, 41
U S.C. § 52 (1976), while others indicate that corporations are within the reach of the criminal
prohibition by including them in the penalty clause, see, e.g., National Housing Act of 1933, 12
U S.C. § 378 (1976); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 714m(f) (1976); Wholesome
Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 602, 610, 611 (1976); Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 88, 90 (1976);
Navigable Waterways Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 406, 411, 419, 449, 502 (1976); Oil Pollution Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1001(f) (1976). Still others include the term corporation in both such provisions. See,
e.g.. Tobacco Statistics Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 503-504 (1976); Export Standards Acts, 7 U.S.C. §§ 586,
589, 596, 599 (1976); Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(3) (a), 10(3)-(4) (1976). In addition,
some statutes contain provisions specifying that the acts and omissions of corporate agents occur-
ring within the scope of employment shall be deemed the acts and omissions of the corporation.
See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4 (1976); Cotton Statistics and Estimates Act, 7
US.C. § 473c-3 (1976); Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 217 (1976); Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 41(l)-(2) (1976). For a more extensive listing of examples, see 1 NAT'L COMM. ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS, STAFF MEMORANDA ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR
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corporations during the last decade3 has brought to the fore the true
breadth of corporate exposure to criminal liability.4
While it has long been settled that corporations constitutionally may
be held accountable for criminal misdeeds of their agents,5 one detects
a current sense of uneasiness regarding the appropriate role and scope
of corporate criminal liability.6 Have we, for instance, strayed too far
from the mens rea model of criminality when dealing with institutional
misbehavior?7 A vast array of penal statutes applicable to the corpo-
rate entity dispenses with any requirement of moral blameworthiness.8
Is it time, perhaps, to re-examine such offenses in light of traditional
notions of culpability so that we may arrive at a "consensus"9 about
what constitutes "truly culpable"10 corporate wrongdoing and elimi-
nate criminal penalties for "trivial conduct?"I
Beyond concerns regarding the philosophical implications of corpo-
rate criminal liability, one detects a sentiment that we are due an ac-
counting regarding the utility of corporate criminal sanctions. Such
CRIMES INVOLVING CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ARTIFICIAL ENTITIES: SECTION 402-406, App. A
(1970).
3. The interest has not been limited to academic and political circles. There is objective
data supporting the widespread belief that the number of federal criminal prosecutions to remedy
violations of regulatory statutes is on the increase. See Orland, Relections on Corporate Crime:
Law in Search of Theory and Scholarshp, 17 AM. CIUM. L. REv. 501, 501-02 n.4 (1980); Develop.
ments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1227 n.5 (1979).
4. See note 2 supra. In addition to the regulatory statutes under which corporations may be
criminally punished, there is a host of statutes within the federal criminal code that may be readily
applied within the corporate setting. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (bribery); Id § 371 (con-
spiracy); id. § 1001 (false statements); id. § 1341 (mail fraud); id. § 1343 (wire fraud).
5. New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). This decision is discussed in
text accompanying notes 108-15 infra.
6. See, eg, Abrams, Criminal Liabtilty of Corporate Officersfor Strict Liability Offenses-4
Comment on Dotterweich and Park, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 463 (1981); Elkins, Corporations andthe
Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. LJ. 73 (1977); Fisse, The Social Policy of Corporate
Criminal Responsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REV. 361 (1978); Friedman, Some Reflections on the Corpora
tion as Criminal Defendant, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 173 (1979); Miller, Corporate Criminal Liabil.
ity A Principle Extended to Its Limits, 38 FED. B.J. 49 (1979); Orland, supra note 3; Spurgeon &
Fagan, Criminal Liability/or L9fe-Endangering Corporate Conduct, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
oGY 400 (1981).
7. See Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Econonic
Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 440-49 (1963); Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 6, at 420-23.
8. See Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PIT. L. REV. 21, 38-40 (1957);
Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 6, at 410-20.
9. Orland, supra note 3, at 511.
10. Id
11. Id
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sentiment occasionally surfaces in the form of contentious law review
articles that indulge in niggling over constituent elements of a model
penal sanction for which some coherent rationale may be offered in
support.'
2
Both forms of disquietude share a common source, for the theories
with which the theoreticians currently are working initially developed
within the context of regulating individual, rather than institutional,
behavior. The theories are extant in an institutional setting only be-
cause the genius of the common law ultimately accorded corporations
anthropomorphic treatment and thus recognized them as persons under
the law.' 3 That in turn inspired the idea that a body of doctrines per-
taining to natural persons might be applied with equal force to the ju-
ristic persons into which corporations had been transformed. The
12. See, e g., Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago Flew of the Economics
of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRim. L. REV. 419 (1980); Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to
Kick", An UnscandalizedInquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386
(1981); McAdams, The Appropriate Sanctionsfor Corporate CriminalLiability: An Eclectic Alterna-
fire. 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 989 (1978); Posner, Optimal Sentencesfor White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 409 (1980).
Some of the polemic calls to mind Oscar Wilde's characterization of the "English country gen-
tleman galloping after a fox--the unspeakable in full pursuit of the uneatable." Wilde, A Woman
of No Importance, Act i.
13. Anthropomorphization of the corporation, which breathed "life" into the corporate body,
inevitably prompted an inquiry into the question whether dissolution of a corporation signaled
corporate "death" for purposes of holding it legally accountable for crimes committed during its
hfetime by human agents. Under the common-law rule, the answer was affirmative. Dissolution
of a corporation effectively caused the corporate entity to cease to exist for all purposes. Defense
Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631, 634 (1949); Chicago Title & Trust Co.
v. Forty-One-Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 125 (1937); Oklahoma Natural Gas
Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927). A dissolved corporation could be neither sued civilly
nor prosecuted criminally.
As corporations became more numerous, however, state legislatures found it necessary to enact
winding-up statutes that prolonged corporate existence for a sufficient period of time to allow
orderly resolution of the affairs of the corporation. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Produ-
cers, 145 F. Supp. 374, 375 (D.D.C. 1956) (most states' corporation laws provide for partial exist-
ence of corporation, after corporation's life terminates, to enforce liabilities that had previously
accrued); United States v. Cigarette Merchandisers Ass'n, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 214, 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) ("[t]he purpose of course in keeping the corporation 'alive' is to ameliorate the unjust and
harsh results to creditors and stockholders alike if the strict common law doctrine of corporate
death and abatement were applied"). See generaly W. FLErCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, §§ 8147-8156 (rev. perm. ed. 1979).
It may be worth observing that the issue may not always be resolved in the clear cut terms of a
life and death matter. Cf. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 571 n.ll
(2d Cir. 1961) (corporation whose charter has been forfeited "not dead" but merely "in a state of
coma").
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simplicity of such notions, however, lay only in their inspiration, not in
their execution.
Early English cases held that corporations were not indictable for
any wrongful act.14 Enduring reluctance to hold corporations crimi-
nally liable was partly attributable to a dictum uttered by Chief Justice
Holt in an anonymous case: "A corporation is not indictable but the
particular members of it are."15 No facts accompanied the remark, nor
was the context in which it was made apparent. These shortcomings,
however, did not dissuade common-law judges from citing Holt's state-
ment with approval. 16
The cluster of troublesome theoretical considerations raised by the
mere notion of corporate criminal liability also impeded doctrinal
growth.1 7 The corporation was recognized in law not as a natural per-
son, but as an artificial entity. As an abstraction, it lacked physical,
mental, and moral capacity to engage in wrongful conduct, or to suffer
punishment. It could neither commit criminal acts, entertain criminal
intent, nor suffer imprisonment. It had no soul, and so could not be
blamed."'
The economic and social role of the corporation in its early develop-
mental period further prolonged its exemption from criminal liability.
Corporations were few in number, well regulated, and chartered to per-
form specific tasks. Their impact on the general populace was minimal
then and additional mechanisms to regulate corporate behavior were
14. At an early date, however, a distinction was drawn between wrongful action and
wrongful inaction. See notes 50-55 infra and accompanying text.
15. Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701). There follows a verbatim report of the
entire case.
Case 935. ANONYMOUS
Corporation is not indictable
Note: per Holt, Chief Justice. A corporation is not indictable, but the particular mem-
bers of it are.
16. Nor, for that fact, were treatise writers dissuaded from adopting it as the definitive state-
ment on the subject. "A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in its
corporate capacity: though its members may in their distinct individual capacities." 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *476.
17. See general, W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, §§ 4942-4959; H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 352-56 (2d ed. 1970); L. LEIoH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORA-
TIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 3-12 (1969); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 853-57
(2d ed. 1961); Welsh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations, 62 L.Q. Rv. 345 (1946).
18. Corporations aggregate "cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate,
for they have no souls, neither can they appear in person, but by attorney." Case of Sutton's
Hospital, 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B. 1612).
[Vol. 60:393
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deemed unnecessary.' 9 As the corporate form became more common,
however, this attitude changed dramatically. During the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, it became evident that shareholders were un-
able or unwilling to supervise the management of corporations,20
whose impact on the community was growing substantially.
It was against that backdrop that common-law judges devised a the-
ory of corporate accountability for crime.21 As perceived necessity was
the mother of invention, it seems appropriate that the theoretical de-
bate about the meaning, function, and utility of the doctrine be placed
in historical perspective before we assess the inevitable criticisms, ex-
planations, and recommendations. Hence, a few pages of history are
offered to accompany the volumes of logic.22
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH DOCTRINE
A. Evolution of the Corporate Form
The English corporation, an organizational form well established by
the fourteenth century, originally could be created only by a grant from
the crown or by an act of Parliament.3 The crown attempted to foster
the idea that incorporation was a privilege, and it encouraged organiza-
tions to become legally authorized entities over which it would hold
control.24 The earliest medieval corporations were ecclesiastical bodies
whose principal function was management of church property.25 From
19. See Elkins, supra note 6, at 87.
20. L. LEIGH, supra note 17, at 19.
21. Imposition of criminal responsibility on corporations is almost exclusively a common-law
tradition. Corporate criminal liability is generally unknown in civil-law countries. Mueller, supra
note 8, at 28-38. Notwithstanding the common-law origin of corporate accountability for crime,
however, English courts were among the slowest to adopt an express rule holding corporations
generally criminally liable. In comparison with developing Canadian and American theory, Eng-
lish law remained in a relative "state of infancy." L. LEIGH, supra note 17, at 2. See also Leigh,
The Criminal Liability of Corporation and Other Groups, 9 OTTAWA L. REV. 247 (1977).
22. The author unabashedly acknowledges the corruption of a finer line penned by Justice
Holmes. Cf. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) ("[u]pon this point a page of
history is worth a volume of logic").
23. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 475-76 (1923); Chayes, The Modem
Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY 25, 33 (E. Mason
ed. 1961). Until the Reformation, the Pope created ecclesiastical corporations. Id
24. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 478-79; Chayes, supra note 23, at 33.
25. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 471-74. See generally Carr, Early Forms of
Corporateness, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 161 (1909).
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those bodies evolved lay associations, chiefly municipalities, 26 and mer-
cantile and craft guilds,27 the precursors of the modem business
corporation.
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the importance of
corporations grew as hospitals, universities, and other similar associa-
tions adapted to the corporate form.28  Also of growing importance by
the end of this period was the joint stock company.29 This form of
business association was most useful in the promotion of new industry
and the mobilization of national credit,30 and joint stock companies
were formed to conduct such divers enterprises as "Insurance and Im-
26. Holdsworth notes that as early as the reign of Edward I the borough was referred to as
"un corps." 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 474.
27. The first trades to incorporate were those that provided the community with basic neces-
sities. The earliest to become organized were the weavers, who were granted a charter by Henry
II. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the goldsmiths, mercers, haberdashers,
fishmongers, vintners, and merchant tailors had been chartered. Williston, History of the Law of
Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 108-09 (1888). The charter of incorpora-
tion typically granted a monopoly to engage in a particular trade or to trade in particular parts of
the realm, as well as the right to regulate the trade in which the corporation was engaged. Chayes,
supra note 23, at 33-34; Williston, supra, at 109-11.
28. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L.. 382,
382 (1922).
29. The joint stock company operated as a single entity, with stock contributed and profits
shared by its various members. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 206. Typically, a joint stock
company was formed for a single expedition, upon completion of which the finances were investi-
gated and the venture was wound up, with all the stock (including profits) distributed among
subscribers to that voyage. A new stock, with perhaps the same group of subscribers, would be
formed for each successive expedition. Thus, there was only one company from a legal point of
view, but from an economic standpoint there were many. It was the governing machinery of these
early companies, rather than the stock, that was constant. I W. SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION AND
FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 462 (1912).
30. B. HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND 1800-1867,
at 6 (1963).
By the middle of the sixteenth century a significant increase in foreign trade seemed imminent,
and there was a growing need for venture capital to fund new expeditions. Because the corpora-
tion was viewed as a public agency charged with the governance of a particular trade, membership
was restricted to the merchant class. Merchants therefore enjoyed a quasi-monopoly over avail-
able capital.
If the new trade were to be controlled by corporations, capital for its development would likely
be restricted to those funds already controlled by the merchants. The joint stock system proved to
be a vehicle for breaking down their quasi-monopoly and joint stock companies began to flourish,
sporting a larger and conspicuously nonmercantile element. The companies' socially diverse
membership provided both much needed capital and a more efficient managerial structure, com-
bining "the specific and detailed knowledge of the trader with the broad outlook of the man of
affairs,... [each of whom] in isolation was imperfect." 1 W. ScoTT, supra note 29, at 444.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/6
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provement of Children's Fortunes," and "Making Salt Water Fresh."'3
Most of these companies were unincorporated,32 and many indulged in
wildly extravagant speculation and contrived elaborate schemes to de-
fraud. Having wielded great power without incurring liability for its
misdeeds,33 the joint stock company was blamed for the miseries of the
country. 4
The scandals generated by irresponsible promoters induced a "panic-
stricken Parliament" '3 5 to adopt a resolution condemning their practices
and to enact the Bubble Act, 6 a scathing indictment of those who
"contrived dangerous and mischievous undertakings or projects under
false pretence of the public good," drawing in "unwary persons to sub-
scribe"; who acted "as if they were corporate bodies" and pretended
"to make their shares transferable" without legal authority; and who
engaged in "many other unwarrantable practices (too many to enumer-
ate)," all contributing to "the common grievance, prejudice and incon-
venience. ' 37 Parliament thus enjoined such undertakings and declared
them punishable as public nuisances.38 Only over the next century and
31. Williston, supra note 27, at 112. The capital ofjoint stock companies was largely used for
ventures involving new trades, revived industries or those proposed to be conducted by new meth-
ods, or other endeavors involving a high degree of risk. I W. ScoTT, supra note 29, at 461. Of
necessity, and consonant with their less restrictive membership requirements, shares in these com-
panies were transferable without the consent of any other shareholders. In contrast, corporate
shares were not freely transferable outside the merchant class.
Market quotations on shares or "actions" of many joint stock companies appeared alongside
stock quotations of corporations in an English newspaper. F. MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation,
in SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 208 (1936). See 1 W. Scorr, supra note 29, at 351.
32. Although the primary legal distinction between the corporation and the joint stock com-
pany was the corporation's charter, several of the best known joint stock companies (including the
South Sea Company and the East India Company) were also chartered by the Crown. Williston,
supra note 27, at 109-11.
33. Joint stock companies, like corporations, enjoyed some measure of limited liability for
their debts. As early as the fifteenth century it was established that individual shareholders were
not personally liable for a corporation's debts. 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 203. The
shareholders were required, however, to pay any sums assessed them by the corporation, thus
creating the potential for creditors to satisfy corporate debts by inducing the corporation to levy
against its shareholders. To prevent this manner of debt collection, corporations began contractu-
ally limiting the liability of shareholders to a maximum sum. Many unincorporated companies
sought similar protection for their subscribers. See 1 W. Scorr, supra note 29, at 228, 270.
34. B. HuNT, supra note 30, at 8.
35. F. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 208.
36. 6 Geo. 1, c. 18 (1719).
37. Id
38. Id In addition to the normal fines and penalties for public nuisances, anyone convicted
was subject to the penalties provided in an ancient praemunire statute, 16 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1392)
(including forfeiture of the offender's lands, tenements, goods and chattels, and loss of the king's
Number 2]
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a half did the business corporation and the joint stock company gain
legal and commercial recognition and acceptance and begin to assume
a role more important than individual enterprise in the growth of
commerce.39
B. The Corporate Personality
As the corporate form of governance was becoming established,
three principles essential to the recognition of corporations as persons
evolved.4" First, a corporation was recognized as an entity distinct
from its members.41 Second, corporate property was considered dis-
tinct from the property of its members.42 Third, a judgment against a
corporation could be executed only against the property of the corpora-
tion, not that of its members.43 Extension of the mortmain laws to the
lay corporation invested it with immortality, from which logically fol-
lowed the notion that a corporation could not be outlawed or excom-
municated, assaulted or imprisoned; nor could it commit treason or
felony.44 In the view of some canonists, the corporation could commit
neither sin nor delict.45
Having imputed these attributes to the corporation, however, com-
mon-law lawyers confronted the troublesome question, "how far, if at
all, matters affecting individual members of the corporate body affected
protection), and was made liable for treble damages in a private civil suit. In the only Bubble Act
prosecution reputed to have been brought in the eighteenth century, the punishment meted out to
the offending promoter was hardly draconian. The court considered the imposition of additional
penalties purely discretionary and fined the defendant five pounds and sentenced him to imprison-
ment at the king's pleasure. The King v. Cawood, 92 Eng. Rep. 386 (K.B. 1724). See B. HUNT,
supra note 30, at 7 n.l l. By the time the Bubble Act was repealed in 1825, "most of its teeth had
been drawn" by judicial interpretation. F. MArrLAND, supra note 31, at 209.
39. See B. HUNT, supra note 30, at 13. See also A. DuBois, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COM-
PANY AFTER THE BUBBLE Acr: 1720-1800 (1938).
40. For a critical view of the anthropomorphization of the corporation, see Friedman, supra
note 6. See also Lindley, On the Princoples Which Govern the Criminal and CivilResponsIbIlies of
Corporations, in 2 JuRIDIcAL Soc'y PAPERS 31 (1857); Pollock,Hars the Common LawReceived the
Fiction Theory of Coporations?, 27 L.Q. REV. 219 (1911).
41. 3 W. HoLDswORTH, supra note 23, at 482. The distinction between the corporation and
its members was considered essential to canon-law theory, and it was applied to ecclesiastical
corporations by the early part of the fourteenth century. Id at 483.
42. Id at 482. This was one of the characteristics that distinguished incorporated from unin-
corporated bodies. Id at 484.
43. Id at 482. Conversely, the property of the corporation could not be reached upon a
judgment against its members. Id
44. Id at 484-85.
45. Id at 485.
[Vol. 60:393
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the validity of corporate acts."'  If, for example, members of the cor-
poration acted under duress, would the duress avoid the act as a corpo-
rate act? No, it was held, the corporation was not menaced-only its
individual members had been threatened. 47 If, on the other hand, the
head of the corporation was under some disability at the time of a pur-
ported corporate act (as, for example, a vacancy in the office or out-
lawry of the office holder), that might well have been a good defense in
the event that his successor brought a suit based upon the act.48 The
distinction between natural and juristic persons, it seems, was difficult
to apply logically and consistently to concrete fact patterns.
C. Development of Corporate Liability
From an early age it was established that corporations possessed
many of the same capacities with which natural persons were endowed.
A corporation could own property, enter into contracts, sue, and be
sued.49 Development of a coherent theory of corporate liabilities, on
the other hand, proved more problematical. The corporation as a dis-
tinct entity was an abstraction. It had no mind and so it could not form
criminal intent. Until the development of a theory of vicarious liabil-
ity, the corporation lacked corporeal members and could not act physi-
cally: "A man shall not have a writ of trespass against an abbot and
convent because the convent cannot commit trespass;. . .[nor] shall a
man have a writ of trespass against a mayor or commonalty. . .."SO
As early as 1635, however, a corporation was held liable on a pre-
sentment for nonfeasance.51 There, as in a variety of cases arising dur-
ing the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 2 the inhabitants of a
46. Id
47. Two cases involving this question arose in the late fifteenth century. In the first, an action
of debt was brought against an abbot and a convent. That the abbot's predecessor had compelled
the monks to execute the deed under duress was held to be no plea. Y.B. Mich. 15 Edw. 4, pl. 2,
eitedin 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 23, at 485. See also Abbot J. Hulme's Case, Y.B. Mich. 21
Edw. 4, pl. 53 (p. 70), quoted in 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 485-86.
48. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 486-87.
49. Id at 488.
50. Id (quoting Y.B. Mich. 15 Edw. 4, pL 2).
51. Case of Langforth Bridge, 79 Eng. Rep. 919 (K.B. 1635).
52. See, eg., The King v. Inhabitants of Clifton, 101 Eng. Rep. 280 (K.B. 1794) (quashing the
indictment because the road ran through two counties); Rex v. Inhabitants of Great Broughton, 98
Eng. Rep. 418 (K.B. 1771) (holding that the inhabitants of one division of a parish were not liable
to repair a common highway running through the division when the common law bound the
parish at large to repair highways). See also The King v. Mayor of Stratford upon Avon, 104 Eng.
Rep. 636 (K.B. 1811); The King v. Mayor of Liverpool, 102 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B. 1802); The King
Number 2]
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governmental unit were charged in a criminal proceeding for failure to
repair a public convenience.53 In decisions imposing liability on such
public entities, the courts ordinarily observed that the public conven-
ience in question (usually a bridge or road) had been erected before the
present inhabitants had taken on the responsibilities of the town, par-
ish, or county; that it had been maintained by former inhabitants; and
that present inhabitants were bound to do the same. The corporation
was responsible for making the needed repairs before the present
mayor, aldermen, and burgesses became its directors, and the duty to
repair followed the corporation, not its former members.5 4 By mid-
nineteenth century, it was fairly well established that a corporation was
indictable for a breach of duty consisting of inaction, though not for
felonies or for crimes involving personal violence. 5
A theory of corporate acting also was developing over this period. A
1682 decision held that a corporation qua corporation could be held
liable for the misdeeds of its agents. 6 In that case the mayor of
London and several other officials were charged with usurping the
powers entrusted to them as directors of a body politic and corporate
when they taxed the citizens and then pocketed the money. The court
found the officials liable and ordered forfeiture of the city charter, de-
claring the acts of the agents to be the acts of the corporation.
Later borrowing the theory of vicarious liability from tort law,57
v. Inhabitants of the West Riding of Yorkshire, 96 Eng. Rep. 401 (K.B. 1770); Regina v. Inhabit-
ants Com. Wilts, 91 Eng. Rep. 313 (K.B. 1705); The Queen v. Saintiff, 87 Eng. Rep. 1002 (K.B.
1705); The Queen v. Inhabitants of Cluworth, 87 Eng. Rep. 920 (K.B. 1705).
53. Though such prosecutions were not uncommon, they were perceived not as true criminal
prosecutions but rather as a means to enforce the performance of a public duty. L. LEIOH, supra
note 17, at 16. Even so, the only sanction that could be imposed upon conviction was a fine. A
corporation could not be compelled by indictment to abate a nuisance. That result could be
achieved only by applying for a writ of mandamus. The King v. Severn & Wye Ry., 106 Eng.
Rep. 501 (K.B. 1819).
54. The King v. Mayor of Stratford upon Avon, 104 Eng. Rep. 636 (K.B. 1811).
55. The leading English case on this point was The Queen v. Birmingham & Gloucester Ry.,
114 Eng. Rep. 492 (Q.B. 1842) (corporation indictable for disobeying a statute directing it to con-
struct certain arches across a railway). In that case the court noted the procedural obstacles to
criminal prosecution of a corporation. At assizes, the accused had to appear personally. Since the
corporation could appear only by attorney, it could not be tried at assizes. Indictments could,
however, be removed by writ of certiorari to King's Bench Division, where the corporation could
appear and plead by attorney. That this was a cumbersome and circuitous route for the prosecu-
tor did not alter the criminal liability of the corporation. Id at 496. See also L. LEIGH, supra note
17, at 9-10. This procedural obstacle was removed by the Criminal Justice Act, 1925.
56. The King v. City of London, 8 St. Tr. 1039 (K.B. 1682).
57. The Queen v. Stephens, 1 L.& 702 (Q.B. 1866) (owner of slate quarry liable for nuisance
[Vol. 60:393
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/6
CORPORATE CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY
courts imposed corporate criminal liability for misconduct of employ-
ees acting within the scope of their employment. In The Queen v. Great
North of England Railway5" the company was indicted for cutting
through an existing highway and then strewing it with debris. Both
acts contravened the powers conferred upon the enterprise when it was
incorporated. Noting the development of corporate liability in tort ac-
tions such as trespass, assumpsit, and wrongful distraint, and also ob-
serving that an action on the case would lie under these facts, counsel
for the prosecution argued that further relaxation of the general rule
against corporate liability was warranted. The rule was "established in
a state of society very different from the present, at a time when corpo-
rations were comparatively few in number,"59 and it had been neces-
sary to engraft exceptions upon the rule from an early date. Whenever
application of the rule would cause great inconvenience or tend to de-
feat the purpose for which the corporation was chartered, the court
noted, the exception should prevail.'
Lord Denman, delivering the judgment of the court, characterized
the exemption of corporations from liability for wrongful acts but not
from wrongful omissions to act as a "startling incongruity."'" While
holding that acts of employees were imputable to the corporation,
which therefore could be indicted for misfeasance, he limited the scope
of the decision by making clear that "acts of immorality"--such as per-
jury and offenses against the person-were beyond the capacity of the
body corporate.
These plainly derive their character from the corrupted mind of the per-
son committing them, and are violations of the social duties that belong to
men and subjects. A corporation, which, as such, has no such duties, can-
when employees threw slate stone into the Tivy River); Rex v. Medley, 172 Eng. Rep. 1246 (N.P.
1834) (owners of electric plant liable for nuisance when employees discharged waste from the
plant into the Thames). On the development of the doctrine of vicarious liability, see generally T.
BATY, VICARIous LIABILITY (1916). See also 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 23, at 472-79; Lind-
ley, supra note 40, at 31; Wigmore, Responsibili'for Tortious Acts: Its History (pts. 1 & 2), 7
HARV. L. REv. 315, 383 (1894). For additional authority, see note 133 infra.
58. 115 Eng. Rep. 1294 (Q.B. 1846).
59. Id at 1296 (quoting Beverly v. Lincoln Gas Light & Coke Co., 112 Eng. Rep. 318 (K.B.
1837)).
60. 115 Eng. Rep. at 1296 (quoting Church v. Imperial Gas Light & Coke Co., 112 Eng. Rep.
324 (K.B. 1838)).
61. 115 Eng. Rep. at 1298. The court further observed that it was "as easy to charge one
person, or a body corporate, with erecting a bar across a public road as with the non-repair of it;
and they may as well be compelled to pay a fine for the act as for the omission." Id
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not be guilty in these cases: but they may be guilty as a body corporate of
commanding acts to be done to the nuisance of the community at large.62
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN DOCTRINE
A. The Colonial Corporation
The corporate charter, a grant from the king to the royal governors,
was the foundation of most forms of political organization in the Amer-
ican colonies. 63 When the colonies became states, the power to create
corporations was then reposed in the legislatures, which perpetuated
the corporate form of governance. In Massachusetts, for example, an
early statute provided that "the inhabitants of every town within this
government are hereby declared to be a body politic and corporate. '64
By 1900, the number of incorporated cities, towns, and villages ex-
ceeded 10,000.65
The private business corporation was absorbed into the mainstream
of American life more slowly, however.66 Of the 225 private corporate
charters granted prior to 1800,67 fewer than a third were issued to enter-
prises whose purpose was to engage in general commercial activity.68
62. Id Following this landmark decision, the pattern of corporate criminal prosecution re-
mained one of targeting regulatory offenses that required no culpable mental state. Section 2 of
the Interpretation Act, 1889, further eased the task of developing an appropriate theory of corpo-
rate criminal liability by providing that penal statutes using the term "person" shall be construed
to include "a body corporate," unless a contrary intention appears. Nonetheless it was not until
after the turn of the century that the theory of corporate liability extended to reach mens rea
offenses. See Chuter v. Freeth & Pocock, Ltd., [1911] 2 KB. 832 (violation of Sale of Food and
Drugs Act); Director of Pub. Prosecution v. Kent & Sussex Contractors, Ltd., I K.B. 146 (1944)
(violation of motor fuel rationing order); Rex v. I.C.R. Haulage Co., 30 Crim. App. 31 (1944)
(conspiracy to defraud).
63. Rogers, Municial Corporations 1701-1901, in Two CENTURIEs' GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW 1701-1901, at 218 (1901). The first municipal corporation created by grant was a borough in
Maine that was incorporated in 1624. Id at 209.
64. Id at 219 (citing St. 1785, c. 75, § 8).
65. Id at 224.
66. See generally Baldwin, Private Corporations 1701-1901, in Two CENTURIEs' GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW 1701-1901, at 261 (1901). The relatively slow development of the American busi-
ness corporation is attributable both to the inherited suspicion with which colonial legislators
viewed it and to Parliament's extension of the Bubble Act, in 1741, to prohibit additional Ameri-
can grants of corporate charters for business purposes. Id at 267-68.
67. For a list of these colonial charters, see id at 269-311. "By this time, however, the
number of public and municipal corporations, religious societies, academies, library companies,
and public quasi-corporations, such as drain companies, had become very large, and probably
approached two thousand." Id at 276.
68. The more numerous categories included banks (28), insurance companies (25), and man-
ufacturing concerns (12). Id at 312. Not until well after the turn of the century was the business
of the country conducted by incorporated associations. Id at 275.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/6
Number 2] CORPORATE CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The more typical colonial corporation was quasi-public in character
and was established to improve public transportation facilities. Be-
cause its activity centered around improving navigable waterways69
and building roads and bridges,7" the early corporation was the type of
entity which "carried or might properly have carried the right of emi-
nent domain."71 It is not surprising, then, that it was to the more
prevalent public and quasi-public corporations that criminal liability
first attached.
B. Evolving Theory
1. Nuisance
The law of nuisance provided the earliest weapon in the arsenal of
theories that would support a corporate criminal prosecution.72 Al-
though common nuisance was defined as "an offense against the public,
either by doing a thing which tends to the annoyance of all the king's
subjects, or by neglecting to do a thing which the common good re-
quires,' 73 as had been true in English law the "neglect" prong of the
definition first was applied to American corporations.
Polluted river basins,74 deteriorated roads," decaying bridges,76 and
malodorous slaughterhouses77 constituted the types of nuisances that
were targets of the earliest corporate criminal prosecutions. In one of
69. Forty-seven corporations were engaged in the business of improving rivers, harbors, and
canals. Id at 312.
70. Seventy-four were established for that purpose. Id
71. Id at 276.
72. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Hancock Free Bridge Corp., 68 Mass. 58 (1854); State v.
Morris Canal & Banking Co., 22 N.J.L. 537 (1850); President of Susquehannah & Bath Turnpike
Rd. Co. v. People, 15 Wend. 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend.
539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); State v. Corporation of Shelbyville, 36 Tenn. 176 (1856). In one notable
exception, State v. Dover, 9 N.H. 468 (1838), it seems that the town of Dover was indicted for
refusing to build a road in derogation of a duty to do so. There is no indication that this neglect of
duty created a nuisance. Rather, the prosecution appears to be based purely on official miscon-
duct under an independent theory of criminal nonfeasance. See generally R. PERKINS, CIMINAL
LAW 488-90 (2d ed. 1969). See also Pittsburgh, V. & C. Ry. v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 192 (1882)
(railway company indictable for failure to reconstruct road as required by statute, but not for
nuisance under the facts).
73. People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (emphasis
added). The court cited Hawkins and Blackstone in support of its definition.
74. People v. Corporation of Albany, I Wend. 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
75. Commonwealth v. Hancock Free Bridge Corp., 68 Mass. 58 (1854); President of Sus-
quehannah & Bath Turnlike Rd. Co. v. People, 15 Wend. 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).
76. State v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 22 NJ.L. 537 (1850).
77. State v. Corporation of Shelbyville, 36 Tenn. 176 (1856).
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the first, the City of Albany was indicted for failing to cleanse the basin
of the Hudson River, which had become "foul, filled and choked up
with mud, rubbish, and dead carcasses of animals. 7 s In consequence
the basin emitted noxious fumes, the water became unpotable, and the
conditions posed a menace to public health.
Counsel for the corporation argued that the indictment against the
city in its corporate capacity could not be sustained. If the corporation
indeed had a legal obligation to cleanse the basin (a contested allega-
tion), the individual officers who were obligated to act to abate the nui-
sance should have been prosecuted rather than the corporation.
Reviewing the corporation's conviction, the New York Supreme
Court of Judicature answered the argument by stating:
It is well settled that when ... [corporations or individuals] are bound to
repair a public highway or navigable river, they are liable to indictment
for the neglect of their duty. An indictment and an informortion [sic] are
the only remedies to which the public can resort for a redress of their
grievances in this respect. If an individual has suffered a particular injury,
he may recover his loss by an action on the case.79
The court's language is notable in two respects. First, it indicates that
the principle that corporations may be held criminally liable for non-
feasance was considered well settled as early as 1834. Second, the
statement focuses attention on the public character of the harm and the
need for an effective procedure to remedy it.80
Considering the question whether the city neglected to perform an
obligation imposed by law, the court noted that the city was empow-
ered by statute to abate nuisances in streets and wharves, to prevent
obstructions in the river, and to require excavation, deepening, and
cleansing of the basin. The court reasoned that since the corporation
had the power to abate the nuisance, there could be no question that it
had a duty to exercise that power. The power to abate "constitutes a
part of the mass of corporate powers which they have sought for the
promotion of the public good; the execution of which is not at their
option. They are bound to execute them when demanded by the public
78. People v. Corporation of Albany, 11 Wend. 539, 539 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834).
79. Id at 543.
80. A judgment of conviction of nuisance frequently carried with it an order compelling
abatement. See, e.g., State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 49 N.E. 809 (1898); State v. Paggett, 8
Wash. 579, 36 P. 487 (1894). Indeed abatement was the primary object of a nuisance prosecution.
State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 NJ.L. 360, 370 (1852).
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interest."81 That there may have been no demonstrable private injury
was considered irrelevant.82
2. Nonfeasance Versus Misfeasance
The nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction, so deeply embedded in
English common law, was short lived in American jurisprudence. It
appeared only briefly, and mostly in dicta.83 By mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, two well-reasoned and influential opinions seem to have settled
the question whether corporations were indictable for affirmative acts
as well as omissions to act. In the first, State v. Morris & Essex Rail-
road,84 the company was indicted for nuisance for having constructed a
building upon a public highway and for further obstructing the road
with railroad cars. Company counsel conceded that a corporation
could be liable for nonfeasance, but appealed the corporation's convic-
tion on the sole issue of the propriety of charging the corporation for an
affirmative act.
The Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court began his analy-
sis of the issue by questioning the statement, attributed to Chief Justice
Holt, that "[a] corporation is not indictable, but the particular members
of it are."85 The court doubted that Holt would have stated such a
broad proposition and noted that Holt himself had complained of his
reporters "that the stuff which they published would make posterity
think ill of his understanding, and that of his brethren on the bench."
86
81. People v. Corporation of Albany, II Wend. 539, 543 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). In this case
the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the corporation was bound to abate even though
abatement would require it to exercise powers not conferred by its charter (removal of a bulk-
head), rather than those specifically conferred by law (to order and direct cleansing operations).
82, It would indeed be very remarkable, if a law should be so framed, that a public duty
could not be enforced, unless some person had actually sustained a private injury, and
become entitled to a private action for redress, by reason of a neglect to perform it; in
other words, that a public road, which a corporation is bound by law to repair, may
become ruinous, obviously dangerous and nearly impassable, and yet the public have no
remedy to compel its repair, unless some private person, liable to pay toll, shall venture
upon it, and sustain injury. They are distinct remedies for distinct injuries.
Commonwealth v. Hancock Free Bridge Corp., 68 Mass. 58, 67 (1854).
83. The leading case in point is State v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41 (1841)
(quashing an indictment for erecting a nuisance). See State v. President & Directors of Ohio &
Miss. R.R., 23 Ind. 362 (1864) (citing Great Works Milling with approval). See also McKim v.
Odom, 3 Bland. 403 (Md. Ch. 1828); Orr v. Bank of the United States, 1 Ohio 37 (1822); Com-
monwealth v. President of Swift Run Gap Turnpike, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 362 (1823).
84. 23 NJ.L. 360 (1852).
85. Id at 364 (quoting 12 Mod. 559 [Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701)]).
86. 23 NJ.L. at 364.
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The court then turned its attention to the development of corporate
criminal liability. The court's first premise was that once one accepts
the notion that corporations are indictable for nonfeasance, "all prelim-
inary and formal objections" 87 to finding criminal liability-such as the
corporation's intangibility and consequent incapacity to be arrested, to
appear in court, or to be subjected to imprisonment, as well as consid-
erations of fairness to innocent stockholders-must be dispensed with
because they apply equally to indictments for nonfeasance and misfea-
sance. The distinction lay, if at all, in the argument that while a corpo-
ration can neglect to act, it cannot act with force and therefore cannot
commit acts of trespass or positive wrong.
The court noted that while the early rule was to the contrary, it since
had become well settled that a corporation could be held liable for torts
committed by its agents. 88 Corporations had been held accountable for
trover, negligence, trespass, ejectment, disseisin, assault, and false im-
prisonment.89 If a corporation could be held civilly liable as a natural
person for such tortious acts of its agents, there could be no sound rea-
son for denying its capacity to be made accountable for the same acts in
a criminal prosecution.
A further objection raised by counsel was that a corporation cannot
commit a criminal act because its charter does not confer the power to
do so. The court quickly rejected this ultra vires argument. The logical
extension of such an argument would be that a corporation is not ac-
countable for civil wrongs, which clearly would be unjust as well as
contrary to settled legal principles.90
The final argument made by counsel for the railroad was that be-
cause the individuals who personally participate in the decision to
cause a wrong to be committed and those who personally commit the
wrong are individually responsible, there exists no strong policy favor-
87. Id at 366.
88. "[I]f a corporation has itself no hands with which to strike, it may employ the hands of
others." Id at 367.
89. Id at 367-68.
90. According to the doctrine contended for, if they do an act within the scope of their
corporate powers it is legal, and they are not answerable for the consequences. If the act
be not within the range of their corporate powers, they had no right by law to do it: it
was not one of the objects for which they were incorporated, and therefore is no act of
the corporation at all. This doctrine leads to absolute impunity for every species of
wrong, and can never be sanctioned by any court ofjustice.
Id at 369 (quoting Binney's argument in Chestnut Hill & Spring House Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4
Serg. & Rawl. 6, 12 (Pa. 1818)).
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ing holding the corporation aggregate also responsible. This, too, the
court found unpersuasive. The corporation both instigated and benefit-
ted from the wrong. The individuals who performed the work would
be, in all probability, difficult to identify and financially irresponsible.
Moreover, it was in the best interest of the corporation to be made a
party to the prosecution. As the principal purpose of a prosecution for
nuisance was to compel abatement, an order to abate frequently was
part of the judgment of conviction. If the conviction were to bind the
corporation-in this case the judgment required destruction of a valua-
ble building-clearly the corporation should have had the opportunity
to appear and defend rather than have its rights determined at the trial
of an irresponsible employee who may have acted out of a motive to
harm the company. In any event, there existed no procedures to en-
force a judgment against a corporation that had not been made a party
to the proceeding. For those reasons, the indictment was held proper
and the judgment was affirmed.
Two years later a second important case was decided. In Common-
wealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge9 1 the proprietors were in-
dicted for building a bridge across a river in a manner that obstructed
navigation, thereby causing a public nuisance. Responding to the de-
fendants' objection to the indictment of a corporation for misfeasance,
the court noted that authority for their position could be found in stray
dicta that text writers had incorporated into their works, but that few
courts had actually ruled on the point. Assuming arguendo that the
notion ever had been sound, it had originated during a time when cor-
porations were few in number and had more limited powers and pur-
poses. "Experience has shown the necessity of essentially modifying it
,,92
The court also pointed out that the distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance often is absurd. In this case, for example, it would
have been possible to characterize the wrong as either failure to con-
struct a proper bridge (nonfeasance) or construction of an improper
bridge (misfeasance). In either event the nuisance-obstruction of the
waterway-arose from the presence of a bridge that otherwise would
not have impeded navigation had not the corporation exercised its
91. 68 Mass. 339 (1854). See also Stacey v. Vermont Cent. R.R., 27 Vt. 35 (1854).
92. 68 Mass. at 345.
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power to cause the bridge to be built there.93 In short, no sound reason
for perpetuating a frequently meaningless distinction could be found.
Once the principle that corporations could be convicted of misfea-
sance for creating a nuisance was established, there was no theoretical
impediment to imposing liability for other acts of misfeasance unre-
lated to nuisance. Courts accordingly held corporations amenable to
conviction of such crimes as Sabbath breaking, 94 permitting gaming on
a fair ground,95 charging usurious interest rates, 96 furnishing liquor to
minors,97 and the unauthorized practice of medicine.98
3. Crimes Requiring Intent
In contrast with the rather rapid development and acceptance of a
theory of corporate criminal liability, its extension to crimes requiring
intent lagged behind. The two courts that settled the debate over the
nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction conceded, in their landmark deci-
sions, that a corporation could not be indicted for offenses requiring
evil intent. Treason, felony, perjury, and violent crimes against the
person could be committed only by natural persons.99
93. Id at 346. See also State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 371-72 (1852) (Nevius,
J., concurring):
It requires no great ingenuity to show that a company, as such, may be guilty of a public
nuisance. A canal company, acting within the scope of its chartered rights, constructs a
canal across a public highway or road, but neglects to erect a bridge for the accommoda-
tion of the public travel; such canal becomes a nuisance, as well by the act, as by the
neglect of the company.
Id
94. State v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 15 W. Va. 362 (1879).
95. Commonwealth v. Pulaski County Agricultural & Mechanical Ass'n, 92 Ky. 197, 17 S.W.
442 (1891).
96. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 S.D. 568, 51 N.W. 587 (1892).
97. Southern Express Co. v. State, 1 Ga. App. 700, 58 S.E. 67 (1907).
98. People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Inst., 192 N.Y. 454, 85 N.E. 697 (1908).
99. Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. 339, 345 (1854); State v.
Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 364 (1852). See also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at
*476. One troublesome obstacle to imposing corporate liability for felonies was the nature of the
authorized punishment. The early felonies-murder, wounding, mayhem, false imprisonment,
rape, robbery, burglary, arson, and larceny-all were punishable by death or dismemberment,
sanctions quite incapable of literal application to the corporate entity. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK
& F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 464-511 (2d ed. reissued 1968). As more catego-
ries of wrongful conduct came to be defined as felonies and other sanctions authorized, the early
rule exempting corporations from felony prosecution became the object of criticism. "[A] corpo-
ration cannot be hung: yet there is no reason why it may not be fined, or suffer the loss of its
franchise, for the same act which would subject an individual to the gallows." I J. BIsHOP, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CRmNAL LAW § 506 (3d ed. 1865). The latter view ultimately prevailed.
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Arguments against imposing corporate liability for such crimes gen-
erally followed two familiar themes. First, just as earlier arguments
relied on the fictive character of the corporation to oppose a theory of
corporate acting (it has no hands with which to strike), some opposing
liability for intent crimes also relied on the nature of the corporate en-
tity. Since a corporation "has no soul," it cannot have "actual wicked
intent.' ' t°° It cannot, therefore, be guilty of crimes requiring "malus
animus."'' The second argument revived the ultra vires plea. Some
acts are so far beyond the purposes of the corporation and the powers
granted by its charter that the corporate entity is incapable of commit-
ting them.'02 To impose liability for such acts would be contrary to
settled rules regarding a principal's liability for the acts of its agent.
Courts drew some distinctions, however, between crimes requiring
specific intent and those for which general intent would suffice. In one
sense the acts of the corporation are the acts of its officers, directors,
and employees. 3 When they act on behalf of the corporation, their
100. State v. First Nat'l Bank, 2 S.D. 568, 571, 51 N.W. 587, 587 (1892) (dictum). The corrup-
tion and mismanagement of many corporations, including "[tihe pillaging of the Erie Railroad by
the robber barons in the late 1860's," L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 448 (1973), so
alarmed one essayist that he pointedly called corporations "a class of artificial beings" that estab-
hshed "despotisms" and threatened to become "the masters of their creator[s]. . . . Everywhere
. .they illustrate the truth of the old maxim of the common law, that corporations have no
souls." Adams, _ Chapter fErie, in HIGH FINANCE IN THE SIXTIES 115-16 (F. Hicks ed. 1929).
101. State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 NJ.L. 360, 364 (1852).
102. United States v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, I Alaska 217, 221 (1901); Commonwealth v.
Punxsutawney Street Passenger Ry., 24 Pa. C. 25, 26 (1900). In other words, the ultra vires nature
of the act was measured by degrees for purposes of determining whether a corporation could be
held accountable for it.
A corporation, especially as viewed from the standpoint of the criminal law, is an artifi-
cial creation of the law, consisting of one or several persons endowed with a part of the
duties and capabilities of an unincorporated man. To determine what part and how
much it covers, we look at its particular nature and objects, and the terms of the act of
incorporation. Hence a corporation cannot, in its corporate capacity, commit a crime by
an act in the fullest sense ultra vires and contrary to its nature. But within the sphere of
its corporate capacity, and to an undefined extent beyond, whenever it assumes to act as
a corporation, it has the same capabilities of criminal intent and of act-in other words,
of crime-as an individual man sustaining to the thing the like relations.
United States v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, I Alaska 217, 220 (1901) (quoting Bishop on Criminal
Law).
103. That corporate employees could be held personally accountable for crimes committed on
behalf of a corporation was a point on which there was "no doubt." Regina v. Great North of
England Ry., 115 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1298 (Q.B. 1846). See also Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 469
(1881) ([i]t has ... for years been the law of this State that the officers of a corporation might be
indicted for the neglect of a duty resting upon it"). By 1890, a growing body of case law acknowl-
edged this proposition. See, eg., Elsberry v. State, 52 Ala. 8, 10 (1875); State v. Great Works
Milling & Mfg. Co., 20 Me. 41, 44 (1849); Moore v. State, 49 Miss. 147 (1873), writ dismissed, 88
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motives and intentions, as well as the acts themselves, are imputable to
the corporation. 1°4
If, for example, the invisible, intangible essence of air which we term a
corporation can level mountains, fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks, and
run railroad cars on them, it can also intend to do these acts, and can act
therein as well viciously as virtuously. The ordinary crimes, wherein only
general evil, or the mere purpose to do the forbidden thing, suffices for the
intent, are plainly within this doctrine.105
Thus if a crime were completed merely by the purposeful doing of a
prohibited act, such as taking salmon from a river' 06 or working one's
U.S. 636 (1875); State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852); State v. Patton, 26 N.C. 16
(1843); Exparte Schmidt, 2 Tex. App. 196 (1877). Between 1890 and 1914 alone there were 40
cases in which corporate officers were indicted for Sherman Act violations. United States v. Wise,
370 U.S. 405, 497 n.1 (1962).
It was during this same period, however, that the notion of corporate accountability for crime
was becoming more generally accepted, owing to development of the theory of corporate acting.
Once that acceptance occurred, it was inevitable that individual members of the corporation
would argue that their official acts were acts of the corporation for which they should not be
personally accountable. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 578 F.2d 1246 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 856 (1978); Kelly v. United States, 258 F. 392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 616 (1919);
United States v. Pinkston-Hollar, Inc., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1697 (D. Kan. 1976); State v. Cooley,
141 Tenn. 33, 206 S.W. 182 (1918); Milbrath v. State, 138 Wis. 354, 120 N.W. 252 (1909). See also
Wood v. United States, 204 F. 55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 617 (1913); United States v.
Winslow, 195 F. 578 (D. Mass. 1912), ad, 227 U.S. 202 (1913); United States v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906).
The argument was not entirely illogical, for one of the underpinnings of the rule holding the
corporate entity liable was the traditional sound policy of looking "to the principal rather than the
mere agent," State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 369 (1852), in the context of other
agency problems. Notwithstanding that official acts of corporate officers and employees might be
charged as acts of the corporation, however, courts found this argument wholly unpersuasive.
No doctrine of agency law would permit corporate agents to immunize themselves from crimi-
nal responsibility for their own acts by the simple expedient of incorporating. State v. Cooley, 141
Tenn. 33, 206 S.W. 182 (1918). Adoption of articles of incorporation subjects the resulting corpo-
rate entity to the laws governing corporate bodies, but the incorporators do not thereby extinguish
existing personal duties and liabilities. Milbrath v. State, 138 Wis. 354, 361, 120 N.W. 252, 254
(1909). They may not avail themselves of the advantages derived from conducting business
through the corporate form and then claim that the corporation and its officers have distinct legal
existence. Wood v. United States, 204 F. 55 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 617 (1913). If they
commit crimes in the conduct of corporate business, they merely use the corporation as an instru-
mentality through which they carry out their own unlawful acts. Kopald-Quinn & Co. v. United
States, 101 F.2d 628, 632 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 628 (1939); State v. McBride, 215 Minn.
123, 131, 9 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1943); Milbrath v. State, 138 Wis. 354, 361, 120 N.W. 252, 254
(1909).
104. United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 305-06 (N.D. Cal. 1898); United States v.
Alaska Packers' Ass'n, I Alaska 217, 220 (1901).
105. United States v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, I Alaska 217, 220 (1901).
106. Id at 218-19, 224.
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employees more than eight hours per day,'0 7 the corporation was
indictable.
This principle soon gained the express approval of the United States
Supreme Court in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United
States."' New York Central had been charged and convicted of grant-
ing rebates to sugar refineries in violation of the Elkins Act.'09 On ap-
peal, counsel asserted that section 1 of the Act, which specifically
declared the acts of officers, agents, and employees of a common carrier
to be the acts of the carrier, was unconstitutional. To fine the corpora-
tion for the acts of its employees, counsel argued, amounted to taking
money from and punishing innocent stockholders without due process
of law. Moreover, the argument ran, statutory imputation of criminal
responsibility was contrary to the presumption of innocence accorded
individuals accused of criminal wrongdoing and was thereby pre-
cluded.
Justice Day, writing for a unanimous court,' 10 found no basis in law
or public policy for holding that Congress could not impose such re-
sponsibility on common carriers. Since Congress is empowered to reg-
ulate interstate commerce to eliminate favoritism and discrimination in
the use of the commercial channels of the nation, "[i]t would be a dis-
tinct step backward to hold that Congress cannot control those who are
conducting this interstate commerce by holding them responsible for
the intent and purposes of the agents to whom they have delegated the
power to act.""'
Although the Court believed that some classes of crimes could not be
committed by corporations, ' 2 it found that the instant offense be-
longed to a larger class of offenses consisting merely of purposely doing
something prohibited by statute.' In cases involving this class of
crimes, logic and policy dictated imposition of corporate liability for
wrongs committed by agents acting within the scope of their authority.
107. United States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898).
108. 212 U.S. 481 (1909). Professor Orland has characterized the holding in New York Central
as the typical "prosecution-oriented interpretation" that the Court has historically accorded regu-
latory statutes applicable to corporations. Orland, supra note 3, at 502.
109. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1976).
110. Justice Moody did not participate in the case. 212 U.S. at 499.
111. Id at 496.
112. Id at 494. The Court did not indicate the reasoning behind this statement, nor did it
further enumerate those crimes it thought corporations were incapable of committing.
113. Id
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Enforcement of statutes prohibiting the practice of rebating would be
effective only if the corporation, which derived the benefit from the
unlawful practice, were the target of the prosecution. Recognizing that
the rights of corporations should be respected, as are the rights of natu-
ral persons, the Court nonetheless stated that the law "cannot shut its
eyes to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in mod-
em times are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that
interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands."'1 4 If corpora-
tions were immunized from criminal punishment because of the early
notion that a corporation is incapable of committing a crime, Congress
would lose its only effective method of controlling corporate miscon-
duct and correcting the abuses the statute was designed to reach."
As courts gave express recognition to the capacity of corporations to
commit crimes requiring general intent, open hostility to retention of a
"fanciful [theory] ...in process of abandonment" 1 6 surfaced and
brought to the forefront consideration of the question whether there
remained a sound reason for drawing a distinction between imputing
general and specific intent to corporations. After all, corporations had
been held vicariously liable for such intentional torts as assault and
battery,1 7 libel,"' and malicious prosecution. 119 Because it would be
no more difficult theoretically to impute specific intent for a crime than
a tort,'20 the only point remaining in dispute was whether the corpora-
tion lacked capacity to form evil intention. The suggestion that it did
was met with little patience. "The same law that creates the corpora-
tion may create the crime, and to assert that the Legislature cannot
punish its own creature because it cannot make a creature capable of
violating the law does not . . . bear discussion." 121 The proposition
was simply untenable.' 22
114. I. at 495.
115. Id at 496.
116. United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 835 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906).
117. See, e.g., Evansville & C.R.R. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70 (1866); Brokaw v. New Jersey R.R. &
Transp. Co., 32 N.J.L. 328 (1867).
118. See, e.g., Philadelphia, W. & B.R.R. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 202 (1858); Fogg v.
Boston & L.R.R., 148 Mass. 513, 20 N.E. 109 (1889).
119. See, eg., Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530 (1853); Reed v. Home Say.
Bank, 130 Mass. 443 (1879).
120. United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Telegram Newspaper Co. v.
Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 296-97, 52 N.E. 445, 446 (1899).
121. United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 836 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906).
122. State v. Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 610, 612, 69 S.E. 58, 58 (1910).
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Beginning in the late nineteenth and continuing into the early twenti-
eth century, courts wrestling with this issue began breaking down the
last barrier to imposing on corporations the full range of liabilities to
which natural persons were subject. During this period courts found
corporations properly subject to criminal prosecution for such offenses
as contempt of court, 123 willfully or knowingly obstructing a road,12 4
conspiracy to violate federal and state antitrust laws,125 knowingly
mailing obscene materials,1 26 conspiracy to conceal a bankrupt's as-
sets, 127 willful breach of duties imposed on oleomargarine dealers,1
28
willfully tearing down a stable and fence,129 conspiracy to transport li-
quor into Indian territory, 30 violation of the espionage act,' 31 and even
manslaughter. 132
IV. A RELATED HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT: VICARIOUS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Development of the doctrine of corporate liability for crime, itself a
species of vicarious liability since corporations act only through human
agents, paralleled that of a doctrine of vicarious criminal liability. The
theory by which the criminal conduct of a direct participant might be
imputed to another human being who did not participate in the crime
had its roots in the agency law doctrine of respondeat superior.1
33
123. Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899).
124. State v. White, 96 Mo. App. 34, 69 S.W. 684 (1902).
125. United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906); Chicago,
Wilmington & Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 73 N.E. 770 (1905); State v. Eastern
Coal Co., 29 R.I. 254, 70 A. 1 (1908).
126. United States v. New York Herald Co., 159 F. 296 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907).
127. United States v. Young & Holland Co., 170 F. 110 (C.C.R.I. 1909).
128. United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 (1909).
129. State v. Rowland Lumber Co., 153 N.C. 610, 69 S.E. 58 (1910).
130. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 213 F. 926 (8th Cir. 1914), a7'd, 236 U.S. 531
(1915).
131. United States v. American Socialist Soc'y, 260 F. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), ard, 266 F. 212
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 637 (1920); United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
132. United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904); State v. Lehigh Valley
R R., 90 N.J.L. 372, 103 A. 685 (1917). See also People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 195 N.Y.
102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909) (corporation may be indicted for crimes requiring intent, including man-
slaughter, but wording of instant statute requires human actor).
133. The history and policy underlying the doctrine have been explored at length elsewhere.
For varying accounts, see generally T. BATY, supra note 57; Hackett, Why is a Master Liablefor
the Tort of His Senant?, 7 HARV. L. REv. 107 (1893); Holmes, Agency (pts. I & 2), 4 HARV. L.
REv. 345 (1891), 5 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1891); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J.
105 (1916); Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. Cm. L. REv. 501 (1935);
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A. Historical Origin of the Respondeat Superior Doctrine
Prior to the eighteenth century, the general rule was that a master
was not liable for the acts of his servant unless those acts were pro-
cured, counseled, or commanded by the principal. 134 In the late seven-
teenth century, however, Lord Holt decided several cases that seemed
to represent a departure from strict application of this rule. In the first,
Boson v. Sandford,135 Holt held that shipowners were chargeable for
damage to cargo resulting from the negligence of the ship's master.
Several years later, Lord Holt held a master chargeable for damage
caused by a fire his servant started. 136 Rejecting the argument that the
master should not be held accountable because he had not commanded
the servant to set the fire, Holt laid down the principle that "tho' I am
not bound by the act of a stranger in any case, yet if my servant doth
any thing prejudicial to another, it shall bind me, where it may be pre-
sumed that he acts by my authority, being about my business."'137
By the turn of the century, this developing notion that the master
should be liable if the servant was acting within the course of the
master's business and within the scope of his employment had begun to
displace the requirement that the employer must command or procure
the wrongful act.1 38 It should be noted, however, that the cases care-
fully limited application of the evolving doctrine to civil liability. The
master was liable civiliter, though not criminaliter.1
39
B. Historical Origin of the Doctrine of Parties to Crime
Vicarious liability in criminal law evolved in a similar, if slower,
fashion. Under the early rule one was not accountable for the criminal
Wigmore, supra note 57. See also 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 16-17 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
For a more contemporary view, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-74
(4th ed. 1971). See also R. Moius, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1959).
134. Sayre, CriminalReponsibliltyfor the Acts ofAnother, 43 HARv. L. REv. 689, 691 (1930).
135. 90 Eng. Rep. 377, 638 (K.B. 1690). This was treated as a mixed action for tort and quasi-
contract.
136. Turbervil v. Stamp, 90 Eng. Rep. 590, 846, 903 (K.B. 1697). See also Jones v. Hart, 91
Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B. 1698); Middleton v. Fowler, 91 Eng. Rep. 247 (K.B. 1698); Kingston v. Booth,
90 Eng. Rep. 105 (K.B. 1685); Michael v. Alestree, 83 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B. 1676).
137. Turbervil v. Stamp, 90 Eng. Rep. 590, 590 (K.B. 1697) (emphasis added). Blackstone
construed the law of the time to support the conclusion that the servant would bind his principal if
he acted under either express or implied command or encouragement of the master. 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, supra note 16, at *429-30.
138. Sayre, supra note 134, at 701.
139. Hem v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (K.B. 1708) (action on the case for deceit).
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actions of another unless he procured, commanded, or counseled them.
Insofar as criminal liability was at issue, the developing doctrine of re-
spondeat superior was rejected during the eighteenth century." "It is a
point not to be disputed, but that in criminal cases the principal is not
"1141answerable for the act of the deputy, as he is in civil cases ....
Rather, the liability of each must be determined by the degree of his
participation. "All the authors"'42 who dealt with this question of
criminal liability maintained that the act of the servant would not affect
the master in the absence of a command that the servant engage in the
wrongful conduct. That this was an exceedingly narrow ground for im-
posing criminal liability is illustrated by Regina v. Saunders.43
Saunders, desiring to kill his wife so he could marry another, con-
sulted a friend named Archer. Archer recommended poisoning her,
and he procured for Saunders arsenic and roseacre. Saunders subse-
quently laced some roasted apple with the deadly poisons and served
the dish to his wife. Already feeling ill, she took a few bites and then
gave the apple to their young daughter, who ate it in their presence.
Saunders remained passive in order to conceal his complicity in the
matter. The intended victim recovered, but the child died two days
later. Upon her death, Saunders was charged as principal and Archer
as accessory to her murder. Both were convicted.
The knotty legal issue was whether Archer's conviction could stand.
Archer, alas, had aided his compatriot only to poison the wife, but "no
other." 144 With obvious concern, 145 the judges concluded that his as-
sent to the poisoning of the wife could not be implicitly extended to the
poisoning of the daughter, "for the poisoning of the daughter is a dis-
tinct thing from that to which he was privy, and therefore he shall not
be adjudged accessory to it."'"
In a lengthy reporter's note to the case, Plowden approved the re-
140. See Sayre, su.pra note 134, at 701.
141. Rex v. Huggins, 93 Eng. Rep. 915, 917 (K.B. 1730).
142. Id See, ag., E. CoKE, THIRD INsTrruTE *51; 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *616-
17.
143. 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (K.B. 1575).
144. Id at 709.
145. "And although they were so agreed, yet, rather than make a precedent of it, they re-
prieved him from one session to another for divers sessions, to the intent that they might purchasi
his pardon, and by that means be set at liberty." Id
146. Id
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sult' 47 and summed up his view of the doctrine of accessory liability. A
person might be held liable for the criminal acts of another: (1) when
the crime actually committed is the very crime the nonparticipant has
counseled or commanded the actor to commit, 48 and (2) when the
crime actually committed is different from the crime the nonparticipant
has counseled, but it is a natural consequence of the counseled
crime. 149 When the crime committed does not fall within either of the
above categories, the nonparticipant is liable civilly, but not crimi-
nally.150 This view of the doctrine of accessory liability accurately re-
flected the state of the law not only during Plowden's time but even a
century later. 151
1. Nuisance
Having opened the door to imputation of crimes to the corporate
entity and to imputation of crimes to human nonparticipants (on ad-
mittedly narrow grounds), courts inevitably would join the two issues
in an inquiry into the legal posture of members of the corporate hierar-
chy who did not directly participate in the corporate conduct that con-
stituted an offense. As was true when courts first ventured into a theory
of corporate criminal liability, the early cases in which liability was
imputed to corporate officers were nuisance prosecutions. I"2
147. Id at 711.
148. If, for example, the wife had died or Archer also had counseled poisoning the daughter,
he would be an accessory to murder.
149. If, for example, Archer had counseled Saunders to use the poison to make the wife
gravely ill (the crime of common-law battery), and she died from its effects, Archer would be an
accessory to murder.
150. Plowden's note did not address the issue of civil liability. See Sayre, supra note 134, at
702-04.
151. Id at 697-98.
152. In a separate line of cases, criminal libel prosecutions, courts early established that the
publisher of a newspaper or proprietor of a bookshop could be held liable for the acts of a
subordinate employee who either inserted libelous material in the publication or sold it. Though
knowledge and consent of the publisher or proprietor was an element of the offense, proof of
publication and sale established a prima fade case. See Rex v. Williams, 98 Eng. Rep. 905 (K.B.
1774); Rex v. Almon, 98 Eng. Rep. 411 (K.B. 1770). This evidentiary rule soon became akin to a
substantive rule of law, for it seemed to take on the character of an irrebuttable presumption.
Even though some courts reiterated the prima fade case rhetoric, proof that the proprietor was
inactive in the business or was even incapable of participating in it was insufficient to rebut the
presumption of knowledge and consent. See Rex v. Gutch, 173 Eng. Rep. 1214 (N.P. 1829); Rex
v. Walter, 170 Eng. Rep. 524 (N.P. 1799). Parliament remedied the situation in § 7 of The Libel
Act, 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96 (1843), which specifically provided that the presumption was rebuttable and
that the defendant might prove that the publication occurred "without his authority, consent, or
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In one of the earliest reported cases, Rex v. Medley,153 the directors
and numerous employees of the Equitable Gas Company were indicted
for discharging waste from their plant into the river Thames. The efflu-
ent was described as "nasty stuff fit to poison a horse."' 5 4 So deleteri-
ous was the substance that it "smelt ready to knock anybody down," '155
and a reporter's footnote pointedly assures that the sample produced at
trial "fully justified the witness's statement."' 156 The directors raised in
defense their ignorance of the situation. They rarely visited the site of
the plant and never actively participated in its management. The deci-
sion to dump the sludge into the river was an expedient to which the
workmen resorted only when machinery designed to dispose of the re-
fuse by process of evaporation failed.' 5 7 The act had never been ap-
proved by the directors, and installation of an adequate evaporation
system had since abated the nuisance.
In his instructions to the jury, the judge stated that in his opinion the
directors' unawareness of the condition made no difference, provided
that they had conferred authority on the others to operate the plant.
"[I]f persons for their own advantage employ servants to conduct
works, they must be answerable for what is done by those servants."'5 8
The jury apparently agreed, for it convicted the chairman, deputy
chairman, superintendent, and engineer.
In a subsequent nuisance prosecution, The Queen v. Stephens,159 the
owner of a slate quarry near the Tivy River was indicted for ob-
structing navigation by throwing slate stone and debris into the river.
knowledge, and that the said publication did not arise from want of due care or caution on his
part." Id The statute had a significant impact on subsequent libel prosecutions. See, e.g., The
Queen v. Holbrook, L.R. 4 Q.B.D. 42 (1878); The Queen v. Holbrook, L.R. 3 Q.B.D. 60 (1877).
153. 172 Eng. Rep. 1246 (K.B. 1834).
154. Id at 1248.
155. Id
156. Id at 1248 n.(a) 1.
157. The prosecution introduced evidence that the effluent had caused a substantial fish kill
and made the water unfit to drink. Counsel for the defense argued that if the engineer had not
devised this ingenious method of disposing of the plant's waste, the plant would have had to shut
down and cease lighting the district for a time. He continued:
In considering what is or is not a nuisance, a jury must take into consideration the whole
of the circumstances and consequences. If it can be shewn that the comfort and security
of society are much promoted by particular works, it would be absurd to say that the
poisoning of a few fish was a thing not to be tolerated.
Id at 1249. This line of argument has a remarkably contemporary ring.
158. Id at 1250.
159. L.R. 1 Q.B. 702 (1866). See also People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 46
N.W. 735 (1890).
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Because he was so old, the owner was unable to supervise personally
the removal of quarried slate. He was prepared to show, however, that
the employees had been warned by him, and by his sons as well, not to
pollute the river. Demonstrating lack of sympathy for his position, the
court held that the owner of a business is liable for public nuisance
created by his workmen while working within the scope of their em-
ployment, even if the owner is ignorant of their activities and has given
orders to the contrary.
The nuisance prosecution thus became an established exception to
the general rule that the doctrine of respondeat superior has no place in
the criminal law. 6' The import of the early cases was clear. Those
160. In contemporary times, the proliferation of public welfare offenses has provided impetus
for considering anew the question whether a corporate officer who does not personally participate
in conduct constituting an offense may be held responsible when a subordinate violates a penal
statute. Public welfare offenses typically require neither intent nor guilty knowledge, and instead
simply penalize proscribed conduct or results without regard to mens rea. Strict liability is im-
posed not because the offense might be considered ,nalumprohibilum, but because the conduct
constituting the violation exposes the public to an unacceptable risk of injury that is unaffected by
the intent of the violator. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256, 259 (1942).
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976), fits the public welfare
offense pattern, and prosecutions under § 303 of the Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1976), have served as
the principal vehicles for exploring the potential liability of a corporate officer for violations in
which he played no direct role. Section 303 provides that any person who violates the prohibition
against introducing adulterated or misbranded food, drugs, or cosmetics into commerce is subject
to imprisonment and/or a fine.
In the first significant decision under the Act, a closely divided Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of the president and general manager of the Buffalo Pharmacal Company. United
States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter noted
that the Act puts a seller of goods at risk to know the properties of the commodity he distributes
through the channels of commerce. The regulatory scheme dispenses with "the conventional re-
quirement for criminal conduct--awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger." Id at 281.
Reaffirming the Dotterweich doctrine more than three decades later, the Court stated that mana-
gerial liability under the Act is predicated upon an omission or failure to discharge corporate
responsibility. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). The rationale underlying Dolterwelch
and its progeny is that the degree of public interest in preventing contamination of food and drugs
is sufficiently great that it warrants imposing the highest standard of care on those in the chain of
distribution "who execute the corporate mission." Id at 664.
The Park Court identified two specific positive duties imposed by the Act: (1) "primarily, a
duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur," Id at 672; and (2) an
affirmative duty to seek out and remedy violations that do occur. The Act imposes the highest
duty of foresight and vigilance. Id at 673.
In the contemporary dialogue about corporate criminal liability, commentators have character-
ized the Act and the cases decided thereunder as an "extraordinary expansion of the legal concept
of corporate crime, both by Congress and by the federal courts." Orland, supra note 3, at 503. In
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who owned, operated, or directed the operation of a company were
obliged to exercise supervisory control over subordinate employees.
Neglect of that duty would not be countenanced as a defense in a
criminal nuisance prosecution predicated upon wrongful acts of the
subordinates.
V. AN OBSERVATION
It seems appropriate to observe that the early doctrine through which
corporations and their managers were held criminally liable developed
with little or no heed to traditional notions of culpability. The underly-
ing theory was forged in criminal prosecutions involving public nui-
sances. Institutional behavior that resulted in a "culpable" violation
addition to the cases discussed in note 152 supra and in the text accompanying notes 153-58 supra,
historical antecedents for this pattern of liability may be found in State v. Burnam, 71 Wash. 199,
202, 128 P. 218, 219 (1912) (vicarious liability should be extended to managing agents "when the
offense consists in the violation of a police regulation when neither a guilty knowledge nor a
criminal intent is made an element of the offense") (conviction reversed on other grounds), and
People v. Detroit White Lead Works, 82 Mich. 471, 479, 46 N.W. 735, 737 (1890) (upholding
nuisance convictions of president, vice president, treasurer, and manager who, as officers and di-
rectors of the corporation, "are the persons primarily responsible").
While most of the current body of case law recognizing liability for improper discharge of
corporate responsibilities has been decided in the context of prosecutions under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, various components of the Court's analysis in Dotterweich and Park have been
cited with approval in cases involving criminal violations of such statutes as (I) the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1273 (1976), see United States v. Klehman, 397 F.2d
406 (7th Cir. 1968) (but dismissing criminal information against individual defendant because
prior testimony under subpoena conferred immunity); (2) the Filled Milk Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63
(1976), see Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1944) (upholding convic-
tions of individual defendants responsible for promoting interstate business, without evidence of
personal participation in or knowledge of offending shipments); (3) the Federal Insecticide, Fun-
gicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1976), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 703-708 (1976), see United States v. Frezzo Bros. Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3rd Cir. 1979) (citing as
authority for proposition that defendants' argument that they could not be held individually re-
sponsible when indictment charged them as corporate officers was meritless), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1074 (1980); United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978) (using as authority for
proposition that omission to perform duty may be basis of corporation's liability); (4) the Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), see United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962) (but cf. United
States v. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (holding intent required)); see also United States v. Rachal,
473 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.) (prosecution under Securities Act of 1933, quoting Wise extensively), cert.
denied 412 U.S. 927 (1973); (5) the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976),
and the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-756 (1976), see United States v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 408 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (applying in context of statutory requirement of
willfulness); and (6) the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976), see
United States v. Pinkston-Hollar, Inc., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1697 (D. Kan. 1976) (citing as author-
ity supporting prosecution of corporate vice president as aider and abettor of corporation).
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need not have constituted what we would deem "serious" wrongdoing.
On the contrary, mere improper discharge of corporate responsibilities
could provide a sufficient basis for institutional and individual convic-
tions. Corporate criminal liability was, then, at the outset, strict liabil-
ity. Only in the relatively recent past did we stray from the strict
liability model of corporate criminality to a mens rea model.
Moreover, corporate criminal prosecutions in some respects served
specific, well-defined objectives. In addition to exacting a financial
penalty, prosecution of the corporation initially provided relief from
public inconvenience or hazard through the mechanism of compelling
corporate acts to abate nuisances.1 61 Such proceedings were instituted
as criminal prosecutions because the nuisance affected the public at
large rather than a handful of individuals. Without proof of some spe-
cial injury, a civil action could not have been successfully maintained
by private citizens in their own names. 162 The abatement component
of the prosecution made the corporation a particularly appropriate de-
fendant, inasmuch as corporate property might be ordered removed or
destroyed.
It cannot be said, however, that abatement was the sole purpose of
the early nuisance prosecution. Rex v. Medley,163 provides a good illus-
tration. There the individual defendants argued that the pollution of
the Thames resulted from an emergency that had been resolved and
that effluent from their plant would never again be discharged into the
river. In short, this argument consisted of a plea of abatement accom-
panied by a promise to avoid creation of public nuisances in the future.
Before imposing judgment on the convicted defendants, Judge Lit-
tledale made the following observation:
[W]e think, under all the circumstances, that this is not a matter to be
passed over merely by the infliction of a nominal fine. At the same time,
as no complaint has been made since this indictment was preferred, we do
not think it necessary to visit the offence of these defendants with severe
punishment. 16
The clear implication is that had not the defendants abated the nui-
161. See notes 57 & 80 supra.
162. See Commonwealth v. Hancock Free Bridge Corp., 68 Mass. 58, 67-68 (1854); People v.
Corporation of Albany, II Wend. 539, 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834); The Queen v. Stephens, L.R. 1
Q.B. 702, 704 (1866).
163. 172 Eng. Rep. 1246 (K.B. 1834). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying
notes 153-58 supra.
164. 172 Eng. Rep. at 1250.
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sance, severe punishment would have been in order. The abatement,
however, only mitigated the penalty, which should not have been nom-
inal in any event.
When institutional and managerial liability for regulatory offenses is
placed in historical perspective, there seems less reason to fret over
what has been cast as an "extraordinary expansion of the legal concept
of corporate crime."' 65 The tradidonal model of individual criminal
liability necessitated conduct "that is particularly morally blamewor-
thy"'66 in order to legitimate imposition of punishment. 67 The com-
mon-law model of corporate criminal liability, on the other hand, was
wholly unconcerned with moral blame and only partly concerned with
punishment.
That the early rule and its rationale were responses to particular
needs that arose in the context of special facts and in simpler times is,
of course, inconclusive. The historical facts compel neither continuing
commitment to nor discrediting of the early doctrine in theory and
practice. They suggest, however, that recognition of corporate criminal
accountability constituted a more effective response to problems cre-
ated by corporate business activities than did existing private remedies.
165. Orland, supra note 3, at 503. For the context in which the statement was made, see note
160 supra.
166. Spurgeon & Fagan, supra note 6, at 410.
167. Id at 411.
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